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Introduction
Andy Raymond owns a gun store in Rockville, Maryland, called
Engage Armament.1 In 2014, Raymond thought he could attract
1.

Steve Pokin, Proponents of “Smart Guns” Say NRA Is the Main
Obstacle, Springfield News-Leader (Mo.), Aug. 3, 2014, at C7,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/03/
proponents-smart-guns-nra-obstacle/13551659/.
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business by selling guns equipped with a new technology that
prevented the gun from firing in the hands of anybody but the gun’s
owner—so-called “smart guns.”2 Raymond did not intend to draw
attention to himself by selling these guns, but he was thrust into the
national spotlight by the gun’s manufacturer, Armatix.3 Raymond’s
publicity triggered ardent reactions from those opposing the new
technology, and Raymond began receiving degrading messages and
death threats.4 Immediately, Raymond stopped offering the Armatix
smart gun, but he did not understand why some people would object
to the product.5 In response, another man in his community claimed
that these guns were a mistake and that no “gun person” would ever
want to own one.6 However, both supporters and critics of these new
smart guns agreed that the technology is untested, making it unclear
what the benefits or dangers may be.7
This is an extreme example, but is meant to communicate the
point that people disagree, quite passionately, on the extent to which
the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms. The text of
the amendment itself reads as follows: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”8 A superficial reading of
that text gives almost no indication on where the boundaries of its
protections lie.9 In 2002, New Jersey tested those boundaries by
enacting a law mandating that “[o]n the first day of the 24th month
following the date on which the Attorney General reports that [smart
guns] are available for retail sales purposes,” it will be illegal to sell
guns in New Jersey that are not smart guns.10
Now suppose in the next few years, New Jersey starts
implementing its smart-gun law. Alternatively, suppose that Congress
or another state legislature passes a similar law requiring that all guns
manufactured or sold be equipped with smart-gun technology. Is
there, as of right now, a basis in the Second Amendment for objecting
to those laws? This Comment suggests that the answer to that
2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.

U.S. Const. amend. II.

9.

See Peter D. Junger, The Original Plain Meaning of the Right to Bear
Arms, 63 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 141, 142 (2012) (“Only the
Humpty Dumpty—sic volo, sic jubeo—school of constitutional analysis
appears capable of dealing with [the Second Amendment].”).

10.

N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:58-2.4, 2C:58-2.5 (2005).
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question is no. In Part I, this Comment discusses how smart-gun
technology functions and the controversy surrounding its
implementation. Part II develops a framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of the new technology based on jurisprudence and
the work of Eugene Volokh. Finally, Part III of this Comment applies
the framework from Part II to the arguments discussed in Part I.

I.

Smart Guns: Concerns, Goals, and Facts

This Comment will first describe how smart-gun technology works
and the various debates surrounding its implementation.11 Understanding the implications, both positive and negative, of smart guns
will shed light on their constitutionality, which is discussed in Part
III. This Comment describes what smart guns are and how they work.
Next, this Comment discusses arguments concerning the functionality
of smart guns, whether they actually will result in less gun violence,
and the cost of implementing a smart-gun regime.
A.

An Overview of Smart-Gun Technology

A smart gun is a gun that “will only fire when grasped by an
authorized user.”12 This takes place using a variety of technologies,
including touch memory, remote control, radio frequency
identification (“RFID”), and biometric technology.13 The most well
known of these technologies is RFID technology. This type of smart
gun requires the user to wear a ring, watch, or bracelet, which
transmits radio waves to the corresponding gun, allowing it to be
fired. However, the distance these radio waves can travel requires the
owner to be holding the gun or similarly situated in proximity for the
gun to fire.14 In order to power the receiver inside the gun, the RFID
smart gun requires batteries. A passive transmitter (the ring, bracelet,
or watch) does not require electricity to function properly.15 It is not
yet clear if RFID smart guns would be sold on a one-gun-one-

11.

This discussion will involve some practical information about how the
technology works in general, but an in-depth discussion is outside the
scope of this Comment. For more information regarding the technology
itself, see Sandia National Laboratories, Smart Gun Technology Project Final Report (1996); Michael J. Ram, Technology
of Safety Devices for Firearms, 12 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 218 (2000).

12.

Ram, supra note 11, at 222.

13.

Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 120. The German
Armatix iP1 pistol is one of the best-known smart guns commercially
available. See Armatix iP1 Pistol, Armatix, http://www.armatix.de/
iP1-Pistol.779.0.html?&L=1 (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).

14.

See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 120.

15.

See id. at 82.
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transmitter policy, but the technology certainly exists to allow
multiple transmitters to access the weapon.
Biometric technology is another popular form of smart-gun
technology. Typically, biometric technology uses digitally recorded
behavioral or physiological characteristics of the owner to verify an
authorized user.16 One common type of biometric technology identifies
an authorized user through fingerprint recognition, but the technology
also includes recognition through voice recognition or a personal
identification number.17 The lock and key function of biometric
technology tends to be very accurate at recognizing an authorized
user, but it consumes a concerning amount of power and requires a
number of seconds in order to identify a user.18 Like RFID, the
legality of authorizing more than one user is not clear, but the
possibility exists.
Regardless of what sort of technology the smart gun uses, the goal
and the essential function of those technologies are the same. If these
smart guns are only sold to law-abiding citizens and only fire in the
hand of the buyer, then chances of the smart gun being used for an
unlawful purpose or in accidental shootings should be substantially
lower than for regular guns.
To some this “unlocking” technology is to firearms as air bags are
to automobiles.19 Guns that only fire in the hands of authorized users
greatly mitigate the threat of a person’s own gun being turned against
her or of accidental shootings in the home.20 To others, smart guns are

16.

See id. at 90 (describing the difference between “behavioral” and
“physiological” characteristics in “identifying” or “verifying” the user’s
identity).

17.

See id.

18.

See id. at 92–93.

19.

See Michael S. Rosenwald, “We Need the iPhone of Guns”: Will Smart
Guns Transform the Gun Industry?, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 2014, at A1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/we-need-the-iphoneof-guns-will-smart-guns-transform-the-gun-industry/2014/02/17/6ebe76
da-8f58-11e3-b227-12a45d109e03_story.html (“Electronic chips inside
the gun and the watch communicate with each other. If the watch is
within close reach of the gun, a light on the grip turns green. Fire away.
No watch means no green light. The gun becomes a paperweight.”).

20.

Jonathan Turley, The Smart Gun: Will New Technology Open Up a
New Wave of Liability Claims Over “Dumb” Guns?, Jonathan Turley
(Feb. 21, 2014), http://jonathanturley.org/2014/02/21/the-smart-gunwill-new-technology-open-up-a-new-wave-of-liability-claims-over-dumbguns/ (“It is technology that could substantially reduce accidental
shootings at home as well as cases where officers have their guns taken
from them in shootings.”).
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an unnecessary hindrance on the ability to use a gun freely and will
actually make gun owners less safe.21
B.

The Debate Surrounding Smart Guns
1.

Are Smart Guns Reliable?

The first, and perhaps largest, concern regarding smart guns is
whether the technology will inhibit the gun’s functionality because the
internal processing system of the gun will result in a delay in use.
This is particularly worrisome to police officers, who use guns in splitsecond decisions and need their guns to be ready to fire immediately.22
Such a delay not only threatens the usability of firearms in the hands
of officers but also in the hands of anyone who is using the gun for
self-defense, which also requires quick decision making.23 In one study,
the Office of Legislative Research to the Connecticut General
Assembly gave great weight to the concern that “neither biometric or
RFID systems are instantaneous as it takes time for the controller to
disengage the safety on the gun.”24 At the same time, the report
observes that there has yet to be any independent study on the
reliability of smart guns.25 Thus, it is difficult to gauge the
appropriate weight to assign to studies about smart guns.
Thankfully, the technology is not likely be commercially available
while it presents the risk of the gun not firing when needed.26 The
United States Department of Justice placed three smart guns in the
“upper tier” of “production-ready design”: iGun’s M-2000, Armatix’s
Smart System, which consists of the iP1 pistol and iW1 watch, and
Kodiak’s Intelligun.27 According to a study by Sandia National
Laboratories, the speed of RFID smart guns was satisfactory for

21.

Joseph Steinberg, Why You Should Be Concerned About the New
“Smart Guns” (Whether You Love or Hate Guns), Forbes (May 4,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/05/04/smart
guns/.

22.

See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 50.

23.

See Steinberg, supra note 21.

24.

Kevin McCarthy, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH, 2013-R-0036, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: Smart Guns 4
(2013).

25.

Id.

26.

Cf. Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 117 (observing
that smart guns’ reliability had not attained the police officers’ ideal
goals as of 1996).

27.

Mark Greene, National Institute of Justice Research Report,
A Review of Gun Safety Technologies 28–30 (June 2013) (ranking
gun technology in tiers based on a scale of 1–9, where receiving a rank
of 7–9 placed the technology in the “Upper Tier”).
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police officers as of 1996.28 Eugene Volokh has observed that “if police
departments are ready to use personalized guns,” then requiring such
guns is less likely to be regarded as an actual change to the weapon’s
reliability.29 This argument cuts both ways because while police may
be ready for the adoption of smart guns, the fact remains that no
police department in the United States has employed the technology.
Perhaps this reflects the broader issue that smart guns are not
currently commercially available in the United States.30 Regardless,
the reliability of smart guns will remain a major issue until
independent studies confirm or deny such concerns.
2.

Will Smart Guns Really Keep Guns Out of the Wrong Hands?

The next important debate about smart guns is whether they
really will reduce unnecessary gun violence by preventing
unauthorized use. It is important to note that “[s]mart guns would
have no impact on firearms already in circulation,”31 which is about
270,000,000 to 310,000,000 guns in the U.S.32 Thus, there is a strong
argument that smart guns will have little to no impact on gun
violence because there are already so many guns available that can be
fired by anyone for any reason. Moreover, given the high number of
lawful gun owners in the United States, and the small likelihood that
a homicide would be “committed by a perpetrator using someone
else’s gun,” there is no reason to expect a noticeable reduction in
violence due to smart guns.33 Some purport that suicides would not
likely be affected by smart guns because most gun suicides take place
28.

See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 117 (noting
that for RFID equipped smart guns “speed [was] not a problem”
although there was a lingering concern was that electromagnetic
interference could render the gun unusable).

29.

Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms in SelfDefense, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1492 (2009).

30.

See McCarthy, supra note 24, at 4–5 (observing that, as of 2012,
smart gun technology “does exist, at least for demonstration purposes,
[but] it is still not” commercially available in a ‘handgun package’). The
Armatrix iP1 described above was briefly for sale by the Oak Tree Gun
Club in California, but the shop has since discontinued sales and denied
ever carrying the gun, after receiving harsh criticism from gun rights
advocates. Michael S. Rosenwald, California Store’s Sale of Smart Gun
Prompts a Furious Backlash, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 2014, at A2.

31.

Violence Policy Center, “Smart” Guns Backgrounder 1 (2013),
available at https://www.vpc.org/fact_sht/Smart%20Gun%202013.pdf.

32.

United States—Gun Facts, Figures, and the Law: Gun Numbers, Gun
Policy.org,
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/united-states
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014).

33.

See Violence Policy Center, supra note 31, at 2 (noting that gun
violence is typically the result of an authorized owner using a gun for an
illegal purpose).
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by an “authorized” gun user.34 Regarding deaths of children using
guns, the NRA has asserted that such statistics are usually
exaggerated and so there is no real need for smart-gun technology to
prevent those types of injuries.35 Further, the gun is still likely to fire
in a struggle where the authorized user and unauthorized user both
have their hands on the gun.36 Putting all the statistics aside, there is
the possibility that the computer technology in smart guns could be
hacked, rendering them usable by anybody.37
Pro–smart gun pundits have fewer statistics to rely on but can
still make a forceful argument. “One out of every six police officers
who is killed in the line of duty is shot with his or her own gun.”38
Smart guns would likely reduce this number. Additionally, if the
owner is a parent who does not authorize her children to use the gun,
the number of children killed or injured by guns would likely drop.39
However, statistics regarding gun violence and the actual effects of
increased gun regulation are typically unreliable and almost
impossible to find.40 Perhaps the best response for the pro–smart gun
pundit is that keeping guns out of the hands of unauthorized users is
a good thing by itself and statistics about gun violence are a
byproduct.41 Given that statistics are not trustworthy, the most
practical step in reducing gun violence may be to ignore the numbers
and try to eliminate the cause of the violence and let that be enough.
To that end, the pro–smart gun pundit has a strong argument
34.

Id. (describing an authorized gun user as an individual who owns a gun
or has access to guns with parental permission).

35.

See Fact Sheet: “Smart” Guns, NRA-ILA (Jan. 27, 2000),
http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/fact-sheets/2000/smart-guns.aspx
(remarking that the number of children killed due to gun violence was
approximately 138 and that “anti-gun groups often grossly exaggerate
the number of such shootings”).

36.

See Steinberg, supra note 21 (“[T]he ‘watch approach’ would seemingly
not prevent a criminal from grabbing someone’s weapon and shooting
him at point black range (as long as the gun was always near the
watch). . . .”).

37.

Id.

38.

Matthew Pontillo, Suing Gun Manufacturers: A Shot in the Dark, 74
St. John’s L. Rev. 1167, 1182 (2000).

39.

Approximately 1,500 children die from gun use every year. See Injury
Research and Policy, Nationwide Children’s, http://www.nationwide
childrens.org/cirp-gun-safety (last visited Sept. 16, 2014).

40.

See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1465 (identifying the inherent problem
with attempting to predict the consequences of increased gun
regulation).

41.

See generally Ram, supra note 11, at 221 (observing that in addition to
preventing unauthorized users from firing them, smart guns “may also
include means to prevent firing the weapon at certain people”).
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because there can be little debate over whether a smart gun is the
most effective means available to restrict gun use to those who are
authorized to use them.
3.

Expect to Pay a Premium Price

Finally, pundits disagree on the feasibility of implementing a
regime making smart guns mandatory because of the technology’s
cost. This is an understandable concern considering that smart guns
are likely to cost approximately twice as much as a normal handgun.42
“[A] possible target for a smart gun technology may be approximately
10% additional cost in volume production,” although a study showed
that some police officers would be willing to spend twice as much on a
reliable smart gun.43 Even those who do not support the idea of
making smart guns mandatory admit that the technology provides
peace of mind worth paying for.44
On the other hand, if there are questions about a smart gun’s
reliability while the product’s cost doubles that of reliable, normal
handguns, there is no sense in forcing the consumer to buy such a
product.45 In fact, “[g]un-store owners say there is no market for such
guns and that they have never had a single customer inquiry.”46 It
seems unfair to require the public to buy smart guns, especially when
the technology is so expensive that even government agencies could

42.

Compare Domestic MSRP Price List 2014, Colt (Jan. 1, 2014),
available at http://www.colt.com/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/
Download.aspx?EntryId=846&PortalId=0&DownloadMethod=attachme
nt (pricing various models of the Colt .45 ACP at approximately
$1,000), with Awr Hawkins, Armatix Ip1 “Smart Gun” Only Chambered
In
.22lr,
Costs
$1,800,
Breitbart
(May
4,
2014),
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/05/04/Much-ToutedSmart-Gun-Only-Chambered-In-22-LR-Costs-1-800.

43.

See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 40–41
(discussing various issues associated with the cost of smart guns).

44.

See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Smart Guns, Electromagnetic Pulse, and
Planning for Unknown-Probability Dangers, The Volokh Conspiracy
(May 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir
acy/wp/2014/05/23/smart-guns-electromagnetic-pulse-and-planning-forunknown-probability-dangers/ (“If I had a child, and smart guns were
reliable enough, I might well be willing to spend some extra money to
get a smart gun instead of my current gun.”).

45.

Cf. Eugene Volokh, “Smart Guns,” THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 22,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/05/22/smart-guns-2/ (observing that “we can see that it’s doable,
we can expect that it will at one point make it big, inventors and
manufacturers have lots of incentive to make it work—but it takes time
for it to develop to the point that it works for consumers”).

46.

Pokin, supra note 1.
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not likely afford it.47 Between the questionable reliability and the lack
of demand for smart guns, the price will not likely drop anytime soon.

II. Second Amendment Jurisprudence and
an Analytical Framework
A.

District of Columbia v. Heller

District of Columbia v. Heller48 is the seminal U.S. Supreme Court
case addressing the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.
An understanding of what rights are protected under Heller is
essential to moving forward with an analysis on the constitutionality
of current or future gun laws. At the same time, much of the analysis
in Heller has little bearing on the scope of this Comment and will not
be discussed.
The suit in Heller arose when Dick Heller applied for a license to
own a handgun in his home in the District of Columbia.49 Essentially,
the District of Columbia regulated gun ownership in two steps. First,
D.C. CODE § 7-2502 did not permit a person to own a handgun
without a certificate from the chief of police.50 Second, D.C. CODE
§ 7-2502 required that a handgun, present lawfully in the owner’s
home, be maintained “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a
trigger lock or similar device.”51 Pursuant to this law, the District of
Columbia refused to issue such a license to Heller.52 Heller then filed
suit to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforcing the law.53

47.

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, supra note 11, at 40 (observing that
police departments function on a minimal budget and will not be able to
afford smart guns).

48.

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

49.

Id. at 575.

50.

Id. (citing D.C. Code §§ 22-4504(a) and 22-4506 (2001)).

51.

Id. (quoting D.C. Code § 7-2502.02 (2001)).

52.

See id. at 574–75 (describing the restrictions on handgun ownership
imposed by D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001), which prevented
the ownership of a handgun without a certificate issued by the Chief of
Police, and in the event that a person did own a handgun in her home,
the handgun was required to be effectively unusable). See generally
D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001) (detailing the circumstances
under which ownership of a handgun is legal).

53.

See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575–76 (“He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second
Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the
registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits
the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the triggerlock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of ‘functional firearms
within the home.’”).
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In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the District of
Columbia law.54 The crux of the majority opinion is that the federal
government may not restrict an individual’s right to self-defense, as
protected in the Second Amendment, by prohibiting the possession of
an operable handgun in the home.55 This Comment discusses how
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, arrived at that conclusion
using an originalism analysis that bifurcated the scope of the Second
Amendment. After discerning the scope, Justice Scalia determined
that the District of Columbia law infringed upon the right to keep
and bear arms. But the Supreme Court concluded that the District of
Columbia law infringed on those rights, not because the law failed a
constitutional standard of review but rather because prohibitions of
the type embodied in the District of Columbia law could be assumed
to offend Second Amendment rights under any analysis.
1.

The Scope of the Second Amendment Under Heller

Justice Scalia began by separating the text of the Second
Amendment into the “prefatory clause” and the “operative clause.”56
His analysis of the operative clause started by determining to what
group of people the Second Amendment refers in “the right of the
people.”57 Through examining the term “right of the people” as used
elsewhere in the Constitution, Scalia established that the starting
point for his analysis was “a strong presumption that the Second
Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all
Americans,” not just those Americans serving in some sort of militia.58
54.

Id. at 570–72, 635.

55.

See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable
for the purpose of immediate self-defense. Assuming that Heller is not
disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District
must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to
carry it in the home.”).

56.

Id. at 577.

57.

See id. at 579 (discussing the term “right of the people” as used in the
Second Amendment).

58.

Id. at 581. Stevens rigorously disagreed with this analysis in his dissent.
See id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens’s dissenting opinion is
due, in large part, to a disagreement about whether the Second
Amendment protects a collective right or an individual right. While
Justice Stevens admits that the Second Amendment protects a right
that “can be enforced by individuals” his evaluation of the scope of that
right conforms to the collective-right school of thought. Id. at 636. For
an excellent discussion on the “collective right theory,” see Roger I.
Roots, The Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the
Second Amendment, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 71, 73–83 (2000) (discussing how
the collective right theory has fallen out of favor).
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The majority went on to say that the meaning of “to keep and bear
arms” does not limit the type of weapons protected under the Second
Amendment to weapons in “military use.”59 After discerning that the
right is unconnected with military service, Justice Scalia determined
that the essential purpose of the right codified in the Second
Amendment was individual self-defense.60 The Second Amendment did
not create this right to self-defense; it is innate.61 Thus, the purpose of
the Second Amendment was only to enshrine it.62
Heller next explained the meaning of the prefatory clause of the
Second Amendment. First, the prefatory clause’s use of the term
“well-regulated militia” did not limit the amendment’s application to
those with some connection to formal military service.63 When the
Framers drafted the Second Amendment, a standing army was a
subsection of able-bodied men who were part of a “militia” and not
the other way around.64 Second, the Second Amendment secures a free
state through the preservation of a militia by (1) enabling all people
to “repel[] invasions and suppress[] insurrections,” (2) “render[ing]
large standing armies unnecessary,” and (3) enabling the people to
better “resist tyranny.”65 While this interpretation may, at first, seem
to tie the Second Amendment to service in some sort of militia,
Justice Scalia determined that the prefatory clause kept the individual
right to bear arms intact. The prefatory clause serves to prevent the
government from eradicating a militia.66
2.

Lawful Regulations and Impermissible Violations
of Second Amendment Rights

The Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment entirely
abrogated the District of Columbia law,67 and in slamming the door
59.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 589.

60.

Id. at 592.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

See id. at 595 (reiterating the definition of this term as espoused in
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).

64.

Id. at 596.

65.

See id. at 597–98 (listing the purpose for which the Framers included
the term “security of a free state”). The purpose of the prefatory clause
is to “prevent the elimination of the militia”; thus, the Second
Amendment does have some connection to organized armed service. Id.
at 599. However, the strength of that connection is not within the scope
of this Comment.

66.

Id. at 599.

67.

See id. at 635 (ruling that the District of Columbia’s ban on keeping a
usable firearm in one’s home violated the Second Amendment).
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on that law, Justice Scalia set two important precedents. First,
Justice Scalia admitted that the Second Amendment does not protect
the right of gun possession for all people and does not protect gun
possession for any purpose.68 Second, the majority did not use a
“standard of review” analysis to strike down the District of Columbia
law but found the law infringed on rights on a categorical basis.
Although Heller’s majority was protective of Second Amendment
rights, it acknowledged that those rights are not unlimited.69 This was
not a revelation discovered in Heller but rather an observation that in
the Second Amendment’s history there are “longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . [and] laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
firearms.”70 In fact, Justice Scalia recognized that this was not an
exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful” regulations of the right to
bears arms.71
At the same time, the majority did not give much guidance to
courts discerning when a regulation is “presumptively lawful” or when
it impermissibly infringes upon Second Amendment rights. Typically,
when a constitutional right is at issue in a case, the Supreme Court
undertakes a “standard of review” analysis to determine if a law
impermissibly burdens those constitutional rights.72 In Heller, Justice
Scalia did not establish what standard of review applies to laws that
are alleged to infringe on Second Amendment rights; in fact, he
acknowledged that the Court was deliberately avoiding the issue.73
However, the majority did give two guideposts for future courts
presented with similar issues. First, rational basis is likely not the
appropriate standard of review when analyzing laws that regulate
rights within the scope of the Second Amendment because rational
68.

Id. at 595.

69.

Id. at 626.

70.

Id. at 626–27.

71.

Id. at 627 n.26, 628 n.27.

72.

See David Chang, Structuring Constitutional Doctrine: Principles,
Proof, and the Functions of Judicial Review, 58 Rutgers L. Rev. 777,
779–80 (2006) (describing the types of scrutiny that typically apply to
corresponding constitutional rights). See also Jason T. Anderson,
Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left
Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 547,
567 (2009) (explaining that it “makes sense to start with a discussion of
fundamental rights, as the Court has actually provided some guidelines
for how to determine if a right is fundamental. Strict scrutiny is
generally thought to apply to ‘any governmental actions which limit the
exercise of ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights”).

73.

See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (observing Justice Breyer’s criticism for
not announcing a standard of review).
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basis would not do justice to the “substance of a constitutional
guarantee.”74 Second, Justice Scalia expressed why no standard of
review was needed:
Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home “the
most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for
protection of one’s home and family,” would fail constitutional
muster.75

Scalia believed that the District of Columbia law so obviously
infringed on Second Amendment rights that the Court needed no
analysis to deem it unconstitutional. In other words, the Supreme
Court determined that the kind of regulations at issue in Heller were
categorically unjustifiable violations of Second Amendment rights.76
Moreover, the majority specifically barred an analysis of the Second
Amendment rights that balanced the burden on protected interests as
compared with the “statute’s salutary effect upon important
government interest.”77 Such a strong position disfavoring regulation
of Second Amendment rights is arguably harsher than strict scrutiny
because it does not inquire into the purpose or tailoring of the law.
Thus, it seems Heller did not give much hope for those in favor of gun
control.
In summary, an inquiry on whether a particular gun law is
constitutional under Heller should proceed by asking whether the
regulation infringes on the scope of the Second Amendment according
to the prefatory or operative clauses. If a law does impede the exercise
of the right to bear arms in the way described in Heller, the court
conducts no analysis, and the law is struck down. At the same time,
certain regulations are almost categorically permissible, or
“presumptively lawful.” While this inquiry is illuminating, it is far
74.

Id. (“Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws,
would pass rational-basis scrutiny. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode
of analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional
commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. . . . In
those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the
very substance of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test
could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may
regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the
guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to
keep and bear arms.”) (citations omitted).

75.

Id. at 628–29.

76.

See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010); Anderson, supra
note 72, at 578 (discussing categorical violations of Second Amendment
rights analogized to categorical violations of First Amendment rights).

77.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
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from exhaustive because it does not deliver “a coherent method with
which to evaluate Second Amendment restrictions.”78 In particular,
Heller did not establish the scope of the Second Amendment’s right to
bear arms or what level of scrutiny applies to laws burdening the
right to bear arms.79 Consequently, the development of a Second
Amendment analysis has been left to lower courts and scholars.80
B.

Post-Heller Courts and Eugene Volokh’s Framework

Since the landmark decision in Heller, federal courts have
struggled to articulate an analysis for gun regulations that
purportedly violate the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms. In order to determine the constitutionality of laws mandating
that guns be equipped with smart-gun technology, this Comment
must lay out a practical analysis. Thus, this Comment first discusses
why adopting the Second Amendment claims framework discussed by
Eugene Volokh agrees with Second Amendment rights and
jurisprudence.81 Second, this Comment will address the “how”
restriction described by Volokh by looking at Jackson v. City and
County of San Francisco.82 Next, this Comment discusses how federal
courts have dealt with “who” restrictions by reviewing cases from
circuit courts. Finally, this Comment discusses how the Second
Circuit handled what Volokh describes as an “expenses” restriction.
The result is that no constitutional objection to smart-gun laws would
likely succeed, using the analysis trending in federal courts.
1.

Restrictions on “How,” “Who,” and “Expenses”
According to Volokh

Predominantly, federal courts cite the lack of guidance regarding
what standard of review applies to right-to-bear-arms claims as the

78.

Jeff Golimowski, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in
a Post-Heller World, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1599, 1600 (2012).

79.

See Anderson, supra note 72, at 547–48 (“But the Court left the door
open for a new debate to begin in the Second Amendment context: what
standard of review applies to legislation that restricts an individual’s
right to bear arms?”).

80.

See Andrew Peace, A Snowball’s Chance in Heller: Why Decastro’s
Substantial Burden Standard Is Unlikely to Survive, 54 B.C. L. Rev.
175, 180 (2013), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol54/iss6/14 (“Since the Supreme Court handed down Heller, courts
have struggled with what standard to use when evaluating Second
Amendment challenges.”).

81.

See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1446 (“I sometimes offer my views on how
particular gun-rights controversies should be resolved, but more often I
just suggest a structure for analyzing those controversies.”).

82.

746 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2014).
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biggest problem when analyzing those claims.83 But as Eugene Volokh
points out, the bigger issue is that federal courts have not recognized
“different categories of justification for a restriction on the right to
bear arms.”84 These categories of regulations mirror those recognized
in First Amendment right cases and should apply in Second
Amendment cases for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court
recognized that traditional limitations on the right to bear arms were
similar to the limitations recognized in First Amendment free speech
cases in Heller.85 Second, it makes sense to differentiate between
restrictions that directly concern a constitutional right and other
measures that appear to do so by regulating a certain right but that
upon further investigation are outside that right’s scope.86 Volokh
developed a framework based on these ideas. In that framework,
different types of restrictions fit into different categories, and the
different categories invoke corresponding standards of review.87 By
identifying the type of gun regulation, a court is more apt to apply a
standard of review that is appropriate considering how the regulation
affects the rights at issue, directly or tangentially.88
Volokh discusses three categories of restrictions that are relevant
to this Comment’s analysis. First, Volokh describes some gun
regulations as “how” restrictions.89 This type of restriction tends to
place requirements on how guns are to be stored: loaded or unloaded,
using trigger locks, keeping the gun disassembled, etc.90 This type of
restriction was contemplated by the Court in Heller, where the
District of Columbia law prohibited keeping a gun in the home if the
gun was not unloaded or disassembled.91 According to Volokh, self83.

See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).

84.

Volokh, supra note 29, at 1446.

85.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). See also Ezell
v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).

86.

See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1449 (“Sometimes a constitutional right
isn’t violated by a restriction because the restriction is outside the terms
of the right as set forth by the constitution. The restriction may still
implicate some of the central concerns that prompted the recognition of
the right, but the constitutional text, the original meaning, or our
understanding of background constitutional norms may lead us to
conclude that the right is narrower than its purposes may suggest.”).

87.

Id. at 1446.

88.

Id. at 1447.

89.

Id. at 1534.

90.

Id.

91.

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008)
(describing the restrictions on handgun ownership imposed by D.C.
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defense requires a gun to be ready at a moment’s notice, so these
types of burdens are typically subject to strict scrutiny for placing a
substantial burden on Second Amendment rights.92
The next type of restriction is a “who” restriction, which bans
certain classes of people from possessing a firearm.93 In Heller, the
Court recognized this type of restriction as “presumptively lawful”
and observed that such prohibitions had been in place since the
inception of the Second Amendment.94 Generally, these types of laws
place restrictions on gun ownership for those who have been convicted
of certain crimes, who are under a certain age, or who have a mental
disability.95 Volokh contends that such restrictions should receive
strict scrutiny because while they may be justifiable, they are
imposing a substantial burden on an entire class’s Second Amendment
rights.96 This seems to go against the Supreme Court’s determination
in Heller that such restrictions are “presumptively lawful,” so the
level of scrutiny that applies to these restrictions is unclear.97
The last type of restriction relevant to this discussion are the
expenses attached to gun ownership. These sorts of restrictions show
up in a number of ways: high taxes, raising the price of the gun, or
fees on permits.98 The burden this imposes on gun ownership is
variable and may shift depending on the purpose of the fee and the
additional amount that the individual must pay.99 However, if the
government were to “materially raise” the “price of guns and
ammunition, or bans on inexpensive firearms,” then the regulation
would constitute a “substantial burden” demanding strict scrutiny.100
Put another way, the government may hike up prices on gun
ownership, but when the prices become a deterrent to owning a gun,
Code §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001), which prevented the ownership of a
handgun without rendering the handgun effectively unusable). See
generally D.C. Code §§ 7-2501.01–2502.02 (2001) (detailing the circumstances under which ownership of a handgun is legal).
92.

See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1534 n.380 (discussing Heller and observing that such laws “substantially burden” the right to bear arms).

93.

Id. at 1493.

94.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.

95.

See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1498–1515 (discussing the various classes
of individuals who cannot own a gun lawfully).

96.

Id. at 1496–97.

97.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. This issue is addressed in detail infra Part
II.B.2.

98.

See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1542–43 (discussing how increasing the
cost of owning a firearm may burden Second Amendment rights).

99.

See id. at 1542–43.

100. Id. at 1542.
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the measure is presumptively unconstitutional. Volokh compares such
measures to imposing a 24-hour waiting period for women seeking
abortions; the measure is permissible until it deters exercising the
right instead of regulating certain aspects of exercising that right.101
2.

Volokh’s Categories in Circuit Courts

Although circuit courts do not seem to be aware of it, they have
developed and applied their own versions of Volokh’s analysis as a
way to deal with the gaps in Heller’s analysis. The result has been
that most gun regulations are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny or
something lower, even if doing so required the court to veer from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Heller. The most noticeable example of
federal courts creating an analysis for Second Amendment claims is
seen in “who” restrictions. Next, this Comment discusses the Ninth
Circuit’s handling of a “how” restriction. Finally, this Comment looks
at the Second Circuit’s ruling regarding “expenses” restrictions.
a.

Bans Resulting from Domestic Misdemeanors as a “Who”
Restriction

United States v. Chovan102 is one of many circuit court cases to
rule on the constitutionality of provisions contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 922.103 The particular provision at issue in the case prohibited a
person from possessing or owning a firearm if that person had “been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence.”104 Because it bans a class of people from owning a firearm,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is an ideal example of a “who” restriction. It
also has been a prolific topic of litigation concerning Second
Amendment rights since Heller.105 Consequently, analysis regarding
this provision has become very popular in addressing “who” restrictions.

101. See id. at 1544 (describing how waiting periods for abortions are
constitutional as long as they are not a “substantial obstacle” to getting
an abortion).
102. 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012) is titled “Unlawful Acts” and places statutory
restraints on gun ownership, sale, possession, purchase, and various
other aspects of gun regulation.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).
105. See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien,
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st
Cir. 2011). See also United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.
2010).
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Based on circuit court cases applying the test announced in
United States v. Marzzarella,106 Chovan conducted the increasingly
popular two-part inquiry to discern whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
violated the Second Amendment.107 In the first part of the analysis,
the Ninth Circuit asked “whether the challenged law burden[ed]
conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”108 Historical evidence
indicated that gun bans for felons did not exist before World War I,
and at that, there is no deep history in the United States of
misdemeanor convictions acting as a bar to gun ownership.109 The
court acknowledged that this regulation was similar to gun bans for
convicted felons, which the Supreme Court recognized as presumptively lawful but did not categorically exclude them from review; they
can still be unconstitutional in effect.110 The court was therefore
persuaded that Chovan had a right to a gun for the purpose of selfdefense, and, therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) touched on Second
Amendment rights.111
The court then asked what level of scrutiny should apply to
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).112 This analysis was based on two queries: “(1)
106. 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). In Marzzarella, the defendant challenged
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2006) by purchasing a gun
with an “obliterated serial number.” Id. at 87. The Third Circuit
determined that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the
regulation at issue was one of the “presumptively lawful” and
“longstanding limitations [that] are exceptions to the right to bear
arms” announced in Heller. Id. at 91 (citing District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008)). Accordingly, the court found that
18 U.S.C. § 922(k) did burden Second Amendment rights, but that
burden was de minimis, so the law passed constitutional muster. Id. at
94, 97, 99. The Court recognized that it was sailing into uncharted
waters and so, as a precaution, also conducted a strict-scrutiny analysis
and still found that 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) was constitutional. Id. at 99. The
court likely did so knowing that its analysis was based on how it
perceived Second Amendment rights, not a prior determination by the
Supreme Court or other authoritative law. See Anderson, supra note 72,
at 556 (“[T]he use of different standards of review reflects and
implements a hierarchy of constitutional values, and that the choice of a
particular standard of review reflects the Court’s value determination of
the right at issue as compared to other constitutionally protected
rights.”).
107. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1134–36 (reviewing the cases that have applied
Marzzarella’s two-part inquiry). See also White, 593 F.3d at 1205;
Chester, 628 F.3d at 680; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
108. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136.
109. See id. at 1137.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1136.
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how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right,
and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”113 To discern
how close the law was to the right to bear arms, the Ninth Circuit
looked to Heller, which gave the scope of Second Amendment
rights.114 The court found that the law at issue did not burden a
“core” Second Amendment right because those “core” rights only
apply to “law-abiding responsible citizens”—not to domestic violence
convicts.115 But the court did find that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
substantially burdened some other Second Amendment rights by
functioning as a lifetime ban on gun ownership.116 The court
determined that the lack of infringement on “core” rights with the
“substantial burden” on others demanded that the court apply
intermediate scrutiny.117
In applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9)’s “prohibition on gun possession by domestic violence
misdemeanants [was] substantially related to the important
government interest of preventing domestic gun violence.”118 Thus, it
passed intermediate scrutiny, and Chovan was banned from owning a
gun for life.
b.

Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, and the “How”
Restriction.

In Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco,119 the Ninth
Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of a San Francisco law
requiring guns stored in the home to be “stored in a locked container
or disabled with a trigger lock that has been approved by the
California Department of Justice.”120 This was the most exemplary
case of a “how” restriction since McDonald v. Chicago.121 Using the
113. Id. at 1138 (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th
Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1140–41 (“We hold that the government has thereby met its
burden to show that § 922(g)(9)’s prohibition on gun possession by
domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to the
important government interest of preventing domestic gun violence.”).
See also United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642–44 (7th Cir. 2010).
119. Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.
2014).
120. Id. at 958 (quoting San Francisco, Cal., Police Code § 4512
(2013)).
121. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). McDonald is the most notable Supreme Court
case to discuss Second Amendment rights since Heller. But while the
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same analysis that applied in Chovan and other “who” restriction
cases, the court upheld the San Francisco ordinance using
intermediate scrutiny.122
In the first part of the court’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit asked
“whether the challenged law burden[ed] conduct protected by the
Second Amendment.”123 The court answered that question by
engaging in a discussion of firearm regulations that have been upheld
as constitutional.124 The Ninth Circuit could not find that the law
resembled any presumptively lawful regulation, “because it applie[d]
to law-abiding citizens, and impose[d] restrictions on the use of
handguns within the home.”125 Thus, the San Francisco Police Code
§ 4512 was within the scope of rights protected in the Second
Amendment.
Next the court determined what level of scrutiny was
appropriate.126 This analysis consisted of the same two parts as in
Chovan: (1) how close is the law to Second Amendment rights and (2)
with what severity does the law burden that right.127 Heller demanded
the court consider the San Francisco law a “core” burden on the
Second Amendment because keeping a gun stored in a locked
container or disabled with a trigger lock makes it more difficult for
the owner to use the gun in self-defense.128 However, this mandate on
Second Amendment may have taken center stage in the Court’s analysis
in McDonald, it did not have the lead role. The facts of McDonald are
similar to Heller but with one key difference: the law at issue in
McDonald was a city ordinance effectively “banning hand gun possession
by almost all private citizens” instead of a federal law. Id. at 3026.
Thus, McDonald was a case that dealt primarily with the incorporation
of Second Amendment Rights—not with whether the manner in which
the Chicago ordinance regulated gun possession was constitutional. Id.
at 3036. See also Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights
after McDonald v. Chicago, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 159, 177–80
(2012) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision to incorporate the
Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment). Discussing
McDonald would be outside the scope of this Comment because its only
relevance to this discussion is that it affirmed Heller. See McDonald, 130
S. Ct. at 3036.
122. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 958, 961.
123. Id. at 960 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d
Cir. 2010)).
124. Id. at 962–63.
125. Id. at 963.
126. Id. at 960 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89).
127. Id. at 963 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137) (9th
Cir. 2013)).
128. Id. at 964 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630
(2008)).
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a gun’s storage did not directly burden Second Amendment core
rights but instead
indirectly burden[ed] the ability to use a handgun, because it
require[d] retrieving a weapon from a locked safe or removing a
trigger lock. But because it burdens only the “manner in which
persons may exercise their Second Amendment rights,” the
regulation more closely resembles a content-neutral speech
restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of
speech. The record indicates that a modern gun safe may be
opened quickly.129

Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to San
Francisco Police Code § 4512.130
Under intermediate scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit applied a twoprong analysis that inquired whether the government interest in
imposing the law was “substantial or important.”131 The court
accepted that San Francisco had a significant interest in preventing
accidental gun use against family and friends, suicides, and in
restricting children’s access to guns.132 The next part of the inquiry
involved whether the law was sufficiently tailored to the government
interest.133 The law accomplished its goals by preventing accidental
gun violence within the home because it restricted access to guns from
children and could prevent suicides.134 Although, if the gun was
needed for self-defense, the trigger lock or safe would restrict access to
the gun by only a “few seconds.” Thus, this burden did not persuade
the court that the law was not sufficiently tailored,135 and the Ninth
Circuit upheld the San Francisco Police Code § 4512.136
c.

Kwong v. Bloomberg and “Fee Jurisprudence”

The last case that illuminates the constitutionality of smart guns
is the Second Circuit’s decision in Kwong v. Bloomberg.137 At issue in
129. Id. (internal citation omitted). This analysis is dubious considering that
in Heller the Supreme Court seemed to categorically strike down the
District of Columbia law’s mandate to keep a gun locked by a trigger or
disassembled and unloaded. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
130. Jackson v. San Francisco, 746 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2014).
131. Id. at 965.
132. See id. at 965–66.
133. Id. at 966.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (2014).
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Kwong was a New York City administrative law that set the licensing
fee for owning a gun in New York City at $340.138 Shui Kwong, the
Second Amendment Foundation, and the New York State Rifle and
Pistol Association claimed that a $340 licensing fee placed too great a
burden on Second Amendment rights and could not pass
constitutional scrutiny.139 The Second Circuit disagreed.140
The court in Kwong considered the licensing fee under “fee
jurisprudence,” which is typically used in assessing the constitutionality of fees government entities charge for “expressive activities
protected by the First Amendment.”141 The permissibility of such a
fee is based on the extent to which it offsets the cost of regulating the
protected activity.142 New York City would incur costs of $343.49 for
each gun license application it received, and thus the licensing fee was
permissible because it did not exceed that cost.143 Since the fee was
not a substantial burden, the Second Circuit applied a level of
scrutiny that would allow a “marginal, incremental or even
appreciable restraint” on Second Amendment rights.144 The court
noted that “the fact that the licensing regime makes the exercise of
one’s Second Amendment rights more expensive does not necessarily
mean that it ‘substantially burdens’ that right.”145 In dicta, the
Second Circuit went as far as to say that the New York City law
would pass intermediate scrutiny if the court chose to apply it.146
However, the court in Kwong did not apply intermediate scrutiny.
The court found that a fee did not actually impose a burden “on the
138. Kwong, 732 F.3d at 161. See generally N.Y.C. Admin Code § 10131(a)(3) (2013) (“Every applicant to whom a license has been issued by
any person other than the police commissioner, except as provided in
paragraph five of this subdivision, for a special permit from the
commissioner granting it validity within the city of New York, shall pay
for such permit a fee of three hundred forty dollars, for each renewal a
fee of three hundred forty dollars, for each replacement of a lost permit
a fee of ten dollars.”).
139. Kwong, 732 F.3d at 165.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. (“Put another way, imposing fees on the exercise of
constitutional rights is permissible when the fees are designed to defray
(and do not exceed) the administrative costs of regulating the protected
activity.”).
143. Id. at 166.
144. Id. at 167.
145. Id. at 167–68.
146. See id. at 168 (observing that New York City has a substantial interest
in reducing gun violence, and recovering costs associated with licensing
guns would allow the city to promote that agenda).
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exercise of constitutional rights” as long as the cost functioned to
“defray” without exceeding the cost of regulating Second Amendment
rights.147

III. Applying the Analysis to Smart-Gun Technology
This Comment’s review and critique of Second Amendment
scholarship hardly does justice to the wealth of knowledge available.
While this Comment has discussed various tests that have been
applied to laws touching on Second Amendment rights, it makes no
suggestion on which is correct. Rather, it only applies the various
tests to what facts are available regarding smart guns in order to
determine whether there is currently a constitutional basis upon
which to make an objection to a law mandating the implementation
of smart-gun technology. The relevant restrictions are “how”
restrictions, “who” restrictions, and “expense” restrictions.148
A.

A “How” Restriction

The “how” restriction was at the center of the opinions in Heller
and Jackson because how the guns were stored slowed access to the
guns in cases of immediate self-defense.149 Similarly, the main concerns
discussed previously in Part I.B.1 are whether smart guns will be
reliable and fire immediately when needed. To determine this issue,
this Comment has discussed how those concerns fit within the
analysis of Heller and Jackson, respectively.150 Applying these
147. Id. at 165.
148. Requiring that only smart guns be sold may raise additional concerns as
a “what” restriction, by effectively banning the use of all guns not
outfitted with smart-gun technology. See generally Volokh, supra note
29, at 1475 (describing a “what” restriction on bans of categories of
weapons). This concern is quickly addressed if all guns available to
consumers would become available as smart guns because these guns
would not be banned, just modified. To that extent, the modification of
these weapons becomes the central concern of a “what” restriction
analysis: the analysis focuses on “[w]hether these requirements
are . . . more expensive, slower to fire, or unreliable.” Id. at 1491. Thus,
the issues for a “what” restriction depend on the other restrictions
discussed in this Comment. In any case, if a smart gun is “highly
reliable, and the batteries are extremely long lived . . . , or the gun is
designed so that, if the electronics fail, the gun is left operational as a
mechanical weapon . . . . Then the requirement probably wouldn’t be a
substantial burden, and should be upheld.” Id. at 1491–92.
149. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 686 (2008). See also
Jackson v. San Francisco, 746 F.3d 954, 961–63 (9th Cir. 2014).
150. An additional question is what would happen if a court reasoned that
neither standard was correct and applied strict scrutiny. However, such
an analysis is outside the scope of this Comment because this Comment
only applies the law as it exists within the circuit courts.
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analyses, it seems that concerns regarding smart guns’ readiness in
emergencies do not rise to the level of a burden on a core Second
Amendment right.
While Heller did not establish an analysis for what the Comment
recognizes as a “how” restriction, the Supreme Court struck down the
provisions of the District of Columbia law that delayed access to a
firearm categorically.151 This means that if smart guns cause delay in
firing the weapon in self-defense, any law restricting ownership solely
to smart guns would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, if smart
guns do not delay an individual’s ability to immediately react, there is
no constitutional issue. The problem with determining this issue now
is that there are not enough studies on smart guns to know what their
average activation time tends to be. At best, information from a
police test of smart guns revealed that RFID smart guns have no
issue with speed.152 Moreover, a good indicator of the readiness and
reliability of smart guns is police use—as they are more likely to rely
on them more frequently than other people.153
However, the technology is not yet instantaneous, meaning a gun
may not be ready to fire at the moment the user lays her hand on
it.154 It is important to note that there is a difference between this sort
of delay and the delay as contemplated in Heller. To disengage a
trigger lock, a gun owner needs to enter a combination or use a key.
Putting a dissembled gun back together would present a similar
problem. Both of these involve a physical act the user must perform
before handling the gun. Conversely, RFID technology requires no
action separate from picking up the firearm. Thus, any delay in the
readiness of the firearm stemming from the smart gun identifying the
user is likely to be less than the delay caused by the measures at issue
in Heller; therefore, the burden may be negligible compared to the
restriction in Heller. Given a minimal yet not “instantaneous” period
between when a smart gun is touched and when it is ready to fire,
and the fact that RFID smart guns already possess “top tier”
151. See Heller, 554 U.S at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on
handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as
does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”) (emphasis added);
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010); Anderson, supra
note 72, at 578 (discussing categorical violations of Second Amendment
rights analogized to categorical violations of First Amendment rights).
152. Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 117 (“Speed is not
a problem, nor is signal integrity since electronics containing error
checking codes can check if a valid transmission was received and if not
try again.”).
153. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1492.
154. See McCarthy, supra note 24, at 4.
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technology,155 RFID smart guns would likely pass muster under
Heller’s categorical exclusion.
If a court were to apply the “how” analysis used in Jackson, it
would likely also decide that a smart-gun mandate passes muster
because the burden imposed by smart guns is minimal. First, a court
would consider whether a smart gun affects a right within the scope
of the Second Amendment. Part of the Second Amendment’s scope, as
described in Heller, is using a gun for the purpose of immediate selfdefense.156 Under Jackson, this would trigger intermediate scrutiny.157
Also, as in Jackson, this burden would touch on a “core” Second
Amendment right because the smart gun would inhibit the owner’s
exercise of self-defense by preventing the owner from immediately
firing.158 But the burden would be slight; easily under the “few
seconds” threshold established in Jackson.159 Further, smart guns
would effectively serve the “important and substantial” government
purpose of preventing accidental injury to children playing with a
smart gun.160 Finally, a court would likely consider smart guns
narrowly tailored to serve the government interest because they are
less restrictive and less burdensome than placing a trigger lock on a
gun or locking the gun in a safe as upheld in Jackson.161 Thus, a
federal court would likely find that a smart-gun mandate would
survive intermediate scrutiny.
B.

A “Who” Restriction

The essential function of a smart gun is to prevent an entire class
of people—those not authorized to use it—from using the gun. As
noted in Chovan, banning an entire class of people from using a
firearm implicates Second Amendment rights.162 However, while the
smart gun functions to prevent those who do not have a right to
possess a firearm from doing so, smart guns themselves are not
responsible for preventing anyone from owning a gun. Rather, smart
guns can be viewed as a practical means of enforcing “who”
restrictions already in place. At the same time, there may be
155. See Greene, supra note 27, at 29–30.
156. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on
handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as
does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”).
157. See Jackson v. San Francisco, 746 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2014).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 966.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013).
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instances in which a person other than the owner needs to use the
firearm for self-defense. For example, a police officer may be in a
situation where she needs to use another officer’s gun in the field.163
This type of prohibition may violate Second Amendment rights
because a fellow police officer surely has the right to own a firearm
and is the type of individual protected under the Second Amendment.
Even if smart guns impose some sort of “who” restriction, a
federal court would likely uphold the restriction. First, whatever
burden a court found likely would be minimal. In Chovan, the
restriction was within the scope of the Second Amendment because
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) placed a life ban on a class that historically had
the right to bear arms for self-defense.164 In stark contrast, smart guns
only prevent gun possession for those not already possessing a gun
and only do so for the period during which that person chooses not to
have a gun. Given this slight burden, it is highly unlikely that a court
would find smart guns touch a “core” right, but more likely that they
would regulate the manner of practicing that right.165 However, since
rational basis is not appropriate, a court would likely undertake an
intermediate scrutiny review. For the purposes of intermediate
scrutiny, the government has a substantial interest in preventing
violence involving guns.166 Assuming that those who lawfully own
guns are the type of people not prone to commit violent acts with
guns,167 then by keeping guns out of the hands of those who possess
guns unlawfully, or for an illicit purpose, smart guns will reduce gun
violence. Therefore, a smart-gun mandate would survive intermediate
scrutiny because smart guns fulfill the important government interest
of reducing violence while imposing a minimal burden on the ability
to defend one’s self.168

163. See Sandia National Laboratories, supra note 11, at 35 (“Some of
the people that officers thought should be able to use their firearms
included: partners, other officers within the department, officers from
another county/state/jurisdiction, gunsmiths and armorers, trainers,
and friends of the officer such as helpful citizens or spouses.”).
164. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136.
165. Id. at 1138.
166. Id. at 1140.
167. See Scott O’Grady, The Third Century NRA, http://home.nra.org/pdf/
thirdcenturynra_scottogrady_june17.pdf (“What many don’t seem to
realize is that an armed, law-abiding citizenry bears no threat to anyone
other than criminals and tyrants.”).
168. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1140 (finding that a law that prevents a class
of people who are more likely to commit violent acts with guns is
tailored to satisfy the government’s goals).
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C.

An “Expenses” Restriction

The last possible constitutional infringement arising from a law
requiring that only smart guns be sold comes from the price of the
technology. As noted earlier, smart guns will not be cheap. As
discussed in Part II, measures that raise the cost of exercising Second
Amendment rights may impose a burden if they “materially raise” the
cost of owning a gun.169 According to Kwong, an increase on the cost
of owning a gun does not impose a burden on Second Amendment
rights so long as the increase in price to the consumers exists only to
offset some cost associated with regulating the right.170 Essentially,
the price increase cannot be an obstacle intended to deter the exercise
of the right; it has to be tied to a legitimate purpose.
Under this analysis, the price of smart guns does not likely
constitute a burden on Second Amendment rights because the price is
tied to new technology that ensures a higher degree of safety. The fact
remains that this price hike may effectively deter many from
purchasing a gun. But this was also the case in Kwong, and there,
some deterrent effect was not enough to abrogate the New York
law.171 However, the Second Circuit indicated that intermediate
scrutiny could be appropriate for provisions that raise the price of a
gun.172 Under intermediate scrutiny, a court would likely decide that
in effectively preventing gun ownership, the cost would infringe on a
“core” Second Amendment right. The severity of that burden would
likely be substantial, considering that the cost of a smart gun is
around twice that of a normal handgun.173 Thus, the analysis would
turn on what important government interest such a price increase
serves and how narrowly tailored the law forcing the price increase is
to that government interest. The government interest would be the
prevention of accidental shootings, suicides, harm to children, and gun
violence in general. The means of achieving this goal are likely
sufficiently tailored because the price increase in a smart gun is due to
its new technology. That technology is tied to the government
purpose of decreasing violence by keeping guns out of the hands of
those with a propensity for violence. In any case, the rise in price
169. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1542.
170. Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2696 (2014).
171. See id. at 167–68 (“Indeed, the fact that the licensing regime makes the
exercise of one’s Second Amendment rights more expensive does not
necessarily mean that it ‘substantially burdens’ that right.”).
172. See id. at 168 (“But we need not definitively decide that applying
heightened scrutiny is unwarranted here because we agree with the
District Court that Admin. Code § 10–131(a)(2) would, in any event,
survive under the so-called ‘intermediate’ form of heightened scrutiny.”).
173. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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might not actually deter would-be gun owners from purchasing a gun
because consumers may be willing to pay more for increased safety.174
Thus, the price increase in smart guns would likely not be a
constructional barrier to implementing a smart-gun-only regime.

Conclusion
While a constitutional challenge relating to the implementation of
smart guns in America has yet to happen, it is not far off. Second
Amendment rights have been highly regarded and disputed, and the
onset of new technology associated with those rights will not be any
different.
Concerns
regarding
smart-gun
technology
are
understandable, but as this Comment demonstrated, there is not yet
a constitutional basis for objecting to smart-guns-only regime. It is
important to note that just because a law that prevents the
manufacturing or purchasing of any gun that is not a smart gun is
constitutional, there are other barriers preventing smart guns from
thriving in the market. Although the technology used in smart guns is
valuable, the demand for the technology is still developing.175 For
now, this means high prices, but that will change as factors in the
market begin influencing manufactures and consumers. The point is
that intelligent arguments can be crafted on both sides, but there is
little reason to believe that any objection to laws that require all
guns, manufactured or sold, to be smart guns has a basis in the
Second Amendment.
Tyler J. Kimberly†

174. See Volokh, supra note 45 (“If I had a child, and smart guns were
reliable enough, I might well be willing to spend some extra money to
get a smart gun instead of my current gun.”); Sandia National
Laboratories, supra note 11, at 40–41 (indicating that some police
officers may be willing to pay twice as much for smart guns).
175. See Volokh, supra note 45 (observing that the incentive for manufacturers to develop a more affordable version of smart guns will increase
as the market expands).
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